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Leadership and Governance:  Agency, Board of Directors, Shareholders 
 
Firm Strategic Control: Direct Ownership, Indirect Ownership, Dispersion, and 
Board of Directors 
 
Abstract: 
Our empirical study of 246 Directors, financial executives, accountants and 
credit/security analysts explore the concept of firm strategic control and what 
theoretically developed attributes contribute to an entity having strategic control over 
another.  Our results suggest that strategic control is established with 100 per cent 
ownership but where there is less than 60-64% ownership then other strategic control 
attributes are necessary.  Our results delve into what combinations of Direct 
ownership, indirect ownership, dispersion and Board of Director representation are 
required for strategic control. 
 
Introduction: 
 Strategic management researchers focusing on corporate governance often 
utilize Agency theory as a foundation (ex. Reuer and Ragozzino, 2006; Yin and Zajac, 
2004; Douma, George and Kabir, 2006).  Theoretically the governance structure is 
such that the Board of Directors represents the owners (stockholders) and aligns the 
interests of the top management team with that of the owners (Johnson, Hoskisson 
and Hitt, 1993).  The in-depth research describes the characteristics of the Board of 
Directors i.e. internal, external, demographics, number, experience, etc., stockholders 
i.e. active, passive, institutional holders, large versus small holders, etc. and the top 
management team (TMT) i.e. stewardship, agent, self-interest, demographics, tenure, 
etc. i.e. Golden and Zajac, 2001; Amihud and Lev, 1981.  However, very little 
research specifically combines all three aspects to determine strategic control of a 
firm and what factors contribute to the controlling of the strategic direction of a firm.  
We theoretically develop a model from Agency Theory to determine which attributes 
account for strategic control.  We describe strategic control as one entity that has the 
capacity to control the operating and financial management policies of another entity, 
irrespective of whether there is a majority ownership interest.   
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Background: 
 From both a theoretical perspective and from a practitioner perspective 
strategic control is of import as the spate of global investment continues unabatedly 
with firms attempting to acquire strategic control.  For the year ended 2007, $4.5 
trillion was spent in 42,364 acquisitions resulting in total strategic control of the 
acquired firm (Karnitshnig, 2008).  However, the global activity is not only pure 
acquisitions, but global investors are acquiring portions/percentages of firms that are 
publicly traded giving rise to strategic management researchers questioning as to what 
percentage or circumstances give rise to the investors’ ability to strategically control.  
Two recent high profile examples are Chinalco and Alcoa Inc’s combined $14.05 
billion investment in Rio Tinto PLC which accounts for a 9% interest (Wall Street 
Journal, 2008) and China Investment Corporation’s (CIC) $5 billion investment in 
Morgan Stanley in December.  From just the CIC’s perspective alone, they anticipate 
continued investments in a portfolio of firms utilizing their $200 billion in assets 
(Davis, 2008). 
 This investment activity places continued pressures upon strategy scholars to 
investigate the outcomes of share acquisition by new funds/firms and the affect this 
has on who has strategic control and governance.  For example, the blocked attempt to 
buy into the US oil company Unocal by a Chinese firm occurred due to the perceived 
amount of strategic control over Unocal’s management and strategy.  Yet literature 
suggests that acquiring shares does not guarantee strategic control over a firm as other 
variables also need to be taken into consideration: indirect strategic control (from 
other subsidiaries or other firms which the investor has an interest) (Bethel, 2007), 
representation on the Board of Directors (Johnson, Hoskisson, and Hitt, 1993; Jensen 
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and Meckling, 1976), dispersion of ownership (Mahrt-Smith, 2005), and block 
ownership (percentage owned) (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). 
 Our research empirically investigates who controls the strategic actions of a 
firm.  In essence, what combination of attributes gives one entity "strategic control" 
over the decision making of another entity?  The model will assist strategic 
management practitioners to assess the extent of strategic control in inter-entity 
relationships.  A number of other professional applications of the model are possible.  
The attributes identified in the model could also form the basis on ways to achieve 
strategic control without the costs of majority equity investment. Attributes of 
strategic control, other than ownership, may produce much more cost effective 
devices for establishing and maintaining strategic control of another entity.  The 
model will help identify possible trade-offs in structuring inter-entity links.  
Conversely the model could be useful in identifying takeover defence strategies. 
 Our empirical study of 246 Directors, financial executives, accountants and 
credit/security analysts explore the concept of firm strategic control and what 
theoretically developed attributes contribute to an entity having strategic control over 
another.  The variables identified in the literature are: total level of ownership, direct 
versus indirect ownership, dispersion of ownership of other stock, and representation 
on the Board of Directors.  Our results suggest that strategic control is established 
with 100 per cent ownership but where there is less than 60-64% ownership then other 
strategic control attributes are necessary.  Our results delve into what combinations of 
direct ownership, indirect ownership, dispersion and Board of Director representation 
are required for strategic control. 
Literature: 
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Corporate governance represents the relationship among stakeholders that 
determines and controls the strategic direction and performance of an organization 
(Hillman, Keim, and Luce, 2001).  The research that explores corporate governance 
mostly utilizes agency theory to explore the linkages and influence between the 
stockholders (Owners) to board-of-directors (Board) to the top management team 
(TMT) to the performance of the firm.  Corporate governance refers to the integrated 
set of internal and external controls that affect the manager-shareholder (agency) 
conflicts of interest resulting from the separation of ownership and control (Berle and 
Means, 1968; Williamson, 1984). 
 Unfortunately, the results of these research efforts have been mixed and 
appear to not fully explain the governance relationship through use of agency theory 
(Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand, 1996) and hopefully our research will strengthen 
agency theory’s explanatory power.  Resource dependence theory has also been 
sparsely used to suggest that the role of the Board is a means for facilitating the 
acquisition of resources critical to the firm’s success (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  
However, this theory also has met with mixed research results and may not fully 
explain the phenomena and importance of governance and performance (Dalton, 
Daily, Ellstrand and Johnson, 1998). 
Agency theory is built on the managerialist notion that separation of 
ownership and control potentially leads to self-interested actions by those in control 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989).  As firm owners are largely removed 
from the operational aspects of the firm, managers are believed to gain an advantage 
over firm owners due to their firm-specific knowledge as well as being ‘in charge’ 
(Mizruchi, 1988).  This managerial strategic control in-turn is theorized to allow the 
managers to pursue actions that benefit themselves rather than those of the owners.  
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These actions create a conflict of interests between the managers and the owners 
which necessitates monitoring mechanisms designed to protect shareholders as 
owners of the firm (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Williamson, 1985). 
Broadly, two control cycles as corporate processes are suggested.  In 
particular, the role of control places four forces operating on the corporation: 1) 
capital markets, 2) legal/political/regulatory systems, 3) product and factor markets, 
and 4) internal control systems (Jensen, 1993).  The external control cycle reflects the 
market for corporate control (Walsh and Seward, 1990).  The capital markets were 
initially quite constrained up until the 1970’s but appear to be more effective in 
today’s market (Pound, 1993).  Product and factor markets are slow to act as a control 
force, but inevitably can decide the corporation’s fate.  The internal control cycle 
captures the activities of a firm as its board-of-directors attempt to monitor and 
control the activities of its top managers.  The internal control mechanisms of the 
corporation operate through the board-of-directors and play an important role in 
disciplining incumbent management (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983).   
 Complementary interventions of both internal and external control 
mechanisms maintain and are seen as inhibiting managerial performance in regard to 
agency problems mentioned earlier (Franks and Mayer, 1996).  Research has 
suggested that some of these mechanisms include: 1) monitoring and exerting and 
influence on control through the team of executives and non-executive directors on 
the board (Coughlin and Schmidt, 1985; Weisbach, 1988), 2) the managerial labor 
market (Fama, 1980), 3) product market competition (Hart, 1984), and 4) the market 
for corporate control (Jensen, 1988).  As the board has the legal authority to hire, fire, 
and compensate top management, to safeguard invested capital, they are an integral 
part of corporate governance (Williamson, 1984). 
Page 6 of 33 
 In an attempt to minimize self-interest by managers and maximize returns to 
the owners (stockholders), control measures are established (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Agency theory suggests that managers, by virtue of their firm-specific knowledge and 
managerial expertise, are believed to gain an advantage over firm owners who are 
largely removed from the operational aspects of the firm (Mizruchi, 1988).  The 
greater the control managers obtain over the firm, the greater the opportunity for 
managers to take actions that would benefit them.  Therefore monitoring mechanisms 
must be installed to protect the shareholders of the firm (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
One of the primary objectives of the board is to serve as this monitoring function 
(Fleischer, Hazard, and Klipper, 1988). 
Hypothesis: 
Consequently the first and most important part of the research is the description 
of strategic control.  Strategic control was modeled as a continuous multi-attribute 
concept for which there exists a unique boundary, θ c, between the regions of 
dominant strategic control and significant influence (see Figure 1).  As noted the 
relevant governance literatures identified the level of ownership, level of direct versus 
indirect ownership, dispersion of non-owned equity, and common board membership, 
as the four key attributes of dominant strategic control. 
Exactly which of these attributes, if any, is significant in the model, and the 
question as to relative importance of each attribute, are both empirical issues that we 
investigate.  Further empirical issues include the degree to which the attributes are 
complementary or substitutes.  Figure 1 depicts strategic control as a continuous 
concept anchored at the points of no strategic control and absolute strategic control.  
At one extreme absolute strategic control represents the unbounded ability to make 
decisions.  This means that no other party (singularly or combined) can determine the 
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business decisions of the strategic controlled entity.  Absolute strategic control 
implies an extremely high level of involvement in the entity, with the upper bound 
being total strategic control (through ownership or other arrangements) of all decision 
making within the entity.  This level of strategic control is not, however, the norm.  
Other parties, such as government, will always have a non-zero influence on the 
decisions of any business. 
 At the other end of the continuum in Figure 1 is the point of no strategic 
control.  This is where the level of involvement by the investor company is such that 
it has no influence over the business decisions of the investee.  Between the points of 
no strategic control and absolute strategic control are three broad categories of partial 
or shared strategic control: insignificant influence, significant influence, and dominant 
strategic control.  Figure 1 shows these decision points as θs and θc. 
The boundary between the first two categories of strategic control, θs, is the 
point where the investor's degree of influence moves from insignificant to significant 
strategic influence over either, or both, the operating and financing policies of the 
investee.  The boundary between the second and third categories of strategic control, 
θc, is the point where the investor moves from significant influence to dominant 
strategic control over the strategic decisions of the investee.  Dominant strategic 
control is the ability to make decisions within the constraints imposed by the 
attributes of the relationship between the parties.  This implies a level of interest 
(equity and/or decision making representation) that would, as a minimum, allow 
strategic control of decisions and operations under 'normal' circumstances (Lee et al, 
1976; Leo, 1987).  For example, holding more than 50 per cent of the voting power of 
a company would afford an entity de jure strategic control over the passage of 
ordinary resolutions in a general meeting.  Corporate legislation in most jurisdictions 
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requires a higher majority for special motions, namely 75 per cent, but this does not 
necessarily represent absolute strategic control.  As long as an entity controls less than 
100 per cent of the voting rights it will have to contend with the interests of minority 
holders.  Corporate law affords special protection to minority interests and regulatory 
bodies have shown a willingness to ensure adequate protection for those interests.  As 
a result the ability to achieve absolute strategic control is limited. 
This section models the general attribute structure of strategic control 
relationships.  From this general framework situation specific attributes are explored.  
The discussion culminates in the following four attribute linear additive model of 
dominant strategic control: 
C X ui j ij ij= +=∑ β0
4
 
(0.1) 
Where: 
Ci  = Degree of strategic control over related entity i; 
X i0 = Unit vector to capture fixed effect over all i entity relationships; 
Xi1 = Total level of ownership in entity i; 
Xi2  = Direct versus indirect ownership in entity i; 
Xi3 = Dispersion of ownership of other stock in entity i; 
Xi4  = Representation on entity i's Board of Directors; and 
ui  = Non-systematic attributes of relationship i. 
 
The development of the model is based on the assumption that the concept of 
strategic control lies on a continuum as depicted in Figure 1.  Multiple attributes are 
assumed to manifest in each strategic control situation.  Different combinations and 
levels of these attributes represent different points along the strategic control 
continuum.  This multi-attribute strategic control continuum is represented as follows: 
 
C f X X X X X ui i i i i in i= +( , , ,... )0 1 2 3,  
(0.2) 
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Ci is a continuous variable, bounded by the points of no and absolute strategic 
control, and represents the degree of strategic control an entity has over its ith related 
entity.  The model depicts the degree of strategic control for the ith entity relationship 
as a function of n+1 attributes (Xij, j = 0,1,2,3 ... ,n; where Xi0 = unit vector for 
common fixed effects), with ui added to capture non-systematic attributes that 
distinguish strategic control relationship i from the relationship k (i ≠ k).   
To operationalize the model, it is assumed that strategic control is a linear 
additive function that maps a multi-dimensional attribute set to a uni-dimensional 
overall strategic control vector.  This assumption seems reasonable given the vast 
body of research in psychology that has found simple linear models more closely 
approximate human judgments than complex lexicographic, satisficing or 
multiplicative choice models (see for example Goldberg, 1968; Hoffman, Slovic and 
Rorer, 1969; Dawes, 1971; Dawes and Corrigan, 1974; Berl, Lewis and Morrison, 
1976, and Barron, 1977).  To maintain generality the mapping function depicted in 
equation 0.3 is constrained to be linear in the parameters, but not the attributes:  
 f X g Xij jj
n
ij( ) ( )= =∑ β0  
(0.3) 
This research focuses exclusively on modeling dominant strategic control and 
the boundary θ c, which has proved economically significant.  Nevertheless the 
general model developed in this section captures all the levels of strategic control.  
Additional theoretical and empirical research is required on the nature of θs  and 
much of the methods’ details have been cut for research parsimiony.  With the general 
model in place, the next section explores the nature of the attributes (the Xij) that give 
rise to strategic control situations.  In particular, the model captures the attributes that 
characterize dominant strategic control situations.  
Majority Ownership: 
Majority ownership may not be necessary or in fact sufficient for dominant 
strategic control.  Strategic control is determined by the facts of the situation that may 
or may not equate with the attributes that lead to strategic control. The level of 
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beneficial interest, through both direct and indirect ownership, is but one attribute that 
can influence the degree of strategic control.  Research suggests that ownership of 
shares does not necessary extrapolate into voting power (Becht, 1999).  However, 
large block shareholders hold power over the strategic actions of firms as they: tended 
to increase restructuring (Bethel and Liebeskind, 1993), are negatively related to 
product diversification (Hoskisson et al, 1994), and is positively associated with sales 
of unrelated businesses (Bergh, 1995).  Ownership structure affects the strategic 
direction such as profit and growth objectives (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). 
The strategic management, finance and economic literatures on the markets for 
corporate control suggest that majority ownership is a sufficient criterion in the 
context of a takeover for one entity to strategic control another (Copeland and 
Weston, 1988).  Anti-takeover counter measures adopted by the management of target 
firms evidences further the import of stock ownership.  Greenmail (share buybacks), 
supermajority and standstill clauses, as well as anticipatory changes to the ownership 
structure all represent takeover defenses that focus on the percentage owned 
(DeAngelo and Rice, 1983; Linn and McConnell, 1983; Dann and DeAngelo, 1985).   
Therefore, the total percentage of shares owned is an important attribute in 
determining if a parent company does or does not strategic control related entity i.  
However, 50 per cent ownership is not a necessary condition for dominant strategic 
control as other attributes may contribute to the strength of the strategic control 
relationship.  If the total percentage ownership, Xij , j = 1, is a significant attribute in 
the strategic control model then: 
 
  H1:  There is a direct proportional relationship between the level of ownership 
and the degree of strategic control over related entity i. 
Level of Direct vs. Indirect Ownership 
As illustrated by the Enron case and the meltdown of the current hybrid 
mortgage investments, the indirect ownership and associations are now the global 
norm in investments.  Associated with majority ownership is the issue of complexity 
of that ownership holding.  The composition of the ownership link is recognized as a 
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key attribute in assessing the degree of strategic control.  Such corporate regulations 
use the term beneficial interest to mean all interests, direct or indirect, from which one 
entity can obtain benefit (for example the Australian Corporations Act 1989; UK 
Companies Act 1989, New Zealand Companies Act 1981).  IAS 27, SSAP 8 (NZ), 
SSAP 14 (UK), and AASB 1024 (Australia) all define an 'ownership interest' to be 
capital held either directly, or indirectly through another entity.  The significance of 
direct and indirect links stems from the degree of strategic control the link implies.  
Problems arise for assessing strategic control when multiple indirect links are created. 
Thirty per cent of the US direct investment abroad in 2006 were classified as 
foreign affiliates highlighting the importance of the upward trend of indirect 
ownership in which US parents’ own foreign affiliates who then own other foreign 
affiliates (Survey of Current Business, 2007).  As technology has created new 
conduits for stocks and securities sales, ownership (both direct and indirect) has never 
been more widely distributed (Bethel, 2007) 
In summary, strategic control assessments are more problematic where 
ownership is indirect through intervening structures.  Strategic management must 
consider whether the complexity of the indirect links lessens the capacity to strategic 
control.  If the directness of the inter-entity ownership, Xij , j = 2, is a significant 
attribute in the strategic control model then: 
H2: There is a direct proportional relationship between the level of direct versus 
indirect ownership and the degree of strategic control over related entity i. 
Dispersion of Ownership of Other Stock 
Williamson (1963) identifies dispersion of ownership as a key determinant of 
managements' ability to make discretionary decisions in an agency environment.  
Dispersion refers to the level of concentration in ownership held by parties other than 
by the potentially dominant entity.  In a strategic control framework a broad view of 
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dispersion would define entity i as widely held if there is a low probability that other 
stockholders will act in concert against the dominant entity.  This includes actions at 
annual general meetings, directors' meetings, or in the courts.  Alternatively, entity i is 
closely held where a third party holds a significant block of i's stock, thus making it 
more likely that the dominant entity has to consider the wishes of the third party.   
There has been much research in regard to Agency theory and dispersion of 
stock ownership.  For example, dispersion of ownership leads to weaker monitoring 
due to both higher coordination costs and increased information asymmetry (Tosi and 
Gomez-Mejia, 1994) as well as hampers the ability and motivation to monitor the firm 
(Khan Dharwadkar and Brandes, 2004).  Dispersed owners are weak as they lack 
information as large investors gather information and offer alternatives to 
management strategic proposals (Mahrt-Smith, 2005).  Ownership dispersion provides 
managers with the ability to extract benefits for themselves such as higher 
compensation as shareholders are unable to remove them (Elston and Goldberg, 2003). 
Evidence from the UK suggests that disperse ownership ensures that only in 
extreme situations does the strategic control of large public companies come under 
pressure from interest groups (Tricker, 1984).  There are, however, large block 
shareholders in many organizations that can restrict the largest shareholder's ability to 
dominate management.  For example, a third party who holds a large equity block 
may disrupt the power of a dominant entity through proxy contests and court action.  
Proxy contests and stockholder suits, however, are not common events and empirical 
evidence suggests that block holders do not always initiate or lead proxy contests 
(Dodd and Warner, 1983).  Although these suits are usually over breaches of fiduciary 
duty (Kesner, Victor and Lamont, 1986; Jones, 1986; Kesner and Johnson, 1990), 
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they essentially serve to define the boundary between dominant strategic control and 
absolute strategic control. 
The strategic management, economics and finance literatures suggest that 
dispersion plays a major role in the operation and regulation of equity markets.  
Dispersion impacts on the market for takeovers, especially where holdings of 
significant fractions of equity are evident or there is competition for 'large blocks' of 
shares (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Williamson, 1983; Dann and DeAngelo, 1983).  What 
constitutes a 'significant fraction' or a 'large block' will depend on the facts of the case.  
Insider trading legislation, takeover regulations, and evidence from capital market 
research, suggests a holding of 5-10 per cent is sufficiently large to constitute a 
'significant fraction' or a 'large block'.  Alternatively, a significantly large holding 
relative to the size of the dominant entity's holding (say about half the size) would 
prima facie give another party a significant voice in any court or general meeting 
challenge.  
In summary, the role of dispersion in equity markets suggests ownership 
dispersion is an important attribute in assessing strategic control relationships.  It 
indicates the possibility of other interests competing for strategic control, which at the 
extreme could make dominant strategic control impossible.  If dispersion of 
ownership of other stock, Xij , j=3, is a significant attribute in the strategic control 
model then: 
H3:  There is a direct proportional relationship between the level of dispersion of 
ownership of other stock and the degree of strategic control over related 
entity i. 
Representation on Board of Directors 
There has been varying research on how and when boards will influence 
strategy.  Early research suggested that boards were powerless and were tools of top 
management (Pfeffer, 1972) but increasingly research suggests that boards take an 
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active role in the strategic direction of the firm (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996).  
The influence of boards and strategic control are such that when boards are inclined 
towards strategic change, subsequent improvements in performance are indicated 
(Golden and Zajac, 2001).  
Outside board membership is expected to be more closely aligned with 
stockholder’s interests and are more likely to become involved in major strategic 
decisions (Johnson, Hoskisson and Hitt, 1993) and as such dismissal of the CEO 
becomes more likely with poor performance (Weisbach, 1988).  The percentage of 
board members is a key determinant of whether one company can achieve dominant 
strategic control over another company as the decision making power in the modern 
corporation lies with the Board of Directors (Tricker, 1984).  The organizational 
literature defines the degree to which there is common strategic control of two 
corporate boards to be proportional to the sum of the directorship overlaps or 
interlocks between the corporations (Mariolis and Jones, 1982).  The creation of 
common or interlocking board representation may, however, be to achieve a range of 
organizational goals.  These include co-opting resources as a means of establishing 
dominant strategic control.   
The strategic management literature suggests director interlocks can be a device 
to co-opt resources, information flows, or to coordinate activities, where legal, 
financial or other constraints make strategic control through outright acquisition 
impossible (Pfeffer, 1972; Dooley, 1969; Burt, 1980; Palmer, 1983; Stearns and 
Mizruchi, 1986; Mizruchi and Stearns, 1988).  The use of common or interlocking 
directorships, in conjunction with other boundary spanning devices, such as 
ownership, allow an entity to achieve dominant strategic control over the operating 
and financing policies of other entities (Palmer, 1983; Zajac, 1988). 
Empirical research on interlocking board membership has not controlled for the 
confounding effects of ownership level and therefore can not distinguish between co-
operation and dominant strategic control motivations for the link.  The evidence does 
suggest reconstitution of a broken interlocking directorship is more likely if there are 
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multiple ties, where the receiving firm is profitable, or when the sending firm has 
borrower-lender financial 'power' over the receiving firm (e.g. Palmer, 1983; Stearns 
and Mizruchi, 1986; Richardson, 1987).  Burt (1980) provides more definitive 
evidence as he considers a broader spectrum of inter-entity ties, including the level of 
ownership.  He finds that ownership and common board membership (direct and 
indirect) are complementary strategic control relations.   
The strength of any inter-corporate relationship, such as strategic control 
associated with majority ownership, is diluted if not associated with representation on 
the Board of Directors.  Conversely, for board membership to confer capacity to 
strategic control generally requires some non-zero ownership interest as well.  
Dominant strategic control is likely to rest with the party that has the majority board 
representation and sufficient ownership interest to establish and maintain that majority 
position.   
In summary, a 'strategically controlled' Board of Directors is one where a 
significant or majority percentage of the board are not independent or are under the 
influence of another entity.  A person on i's Board of Directors is a representative of 
another entity, firstly if that entity has the power to appoint or remove the member 
from i's board.  Secondly, if it is reasonable to assume that a board member's voting 
pattern is under the influence of another entity, or an associate of another entity, then 
that director is a representative of that other entity.  All other directors are considered 
independent of the strategic controlling entity.  If the level of board membership, Xij , 
j = 4, is a significant attribute in the strategic control model then: 
 
H4: There is a direct proportional relationship between the level of common 
board membership and the degree of strategic control over related entity i. 
 
Methodology 
Sample 
A random sample of 1000 directors, financial executives, public accountants 
and credit/security analysts was selected from the US and Australian populations of 
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potential subjects.  Separate sampling frames were identified for the US and Australia.  
Two main sources of potential US subject were employed.  The first was a database 
from the University of Southern California of over 6000 corporate executives, 
directors and public accountants located around the US.  A second database was 
employed to identify credit and security analysts based in California.  A random 
sample of 500 potential subjects was identified from these two databases.  The sample 
was stratified one third credit and security analysts, and two thirds corporate 
executives, directors and public accountants so as to focus more on the US in general. 
The Australian Business Who's Who was used to identify corporate executives 
and directors for the 1000 largest Australian companies.  The sampling frame for 
public accountants was Bond University's School of Business executive database.  An 
outside agency (which must remain confidential) provided a listing for credit and 
security analysts.  Again a random sample of 500 potential subjects was identified 
from these three databases which were stratified one third credit and security analysts, 
and two thirds corporate executives, directors and public accountants. 
The range of subject groups is considered representative of the major users of 
financial statements.  Directors, financial executives, accountants and credit/security 
analysts have to deal with the issue of 'strategic control' frequently and thus are 
considered appropriate judges of whether one company strategic controls another.  No 
specific group of shareholders is included, although some of the subjects may also fall 
into this category.     
The treatment booklet was mailed to potential participants in the US and 
Australia.  Completed test instruments were returned in the supplied self-addressed 
reply-paid envelope.  The response statistics for the mailed survey are summarized in 
Table 1.   Some of the mailed surveys were returned marked indicating participation 
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"Declined" or "Return to Sender" (i.e. respondent not prepared to participate or 
undeliverable due to database decay factors such as location or personal changes).  
From the remaining 611 surveys mailed but not returned unopened, a total of 246 
usable responses were received (i.e. 40.3 per cent of the possible responses).  
Techniques to enhance response rates, such as follow up mailing procedures, were not 
possible due to the anonymous response format and the restricted access to databases.  
 
Table 1: Survey Response Statistics 
Survey Item Australia USA Total 
Random Sample Mailed Survey 500 500 1000 
Less: Returned "Return to Sender"   161 145 306 
Less: Returned "Declined"     42 41 83 
Total Possible Responses 297 314 611 
 
   
Completed Responses 141 117 258 
Less: Unusable Responses     5 7 12 
Total Usable Responses 136 110 246 
% Usable vs. Possible Responses 45.8% 35.1% 40.3% 
 
The usable responses were coded into a spreadsheet by an independent coder with no 
knowledge of the hypotheses being tested.  The coded data were independently 
checked against the hand-written responses.  Data coding and entry errors were 
corrected prior to commencing the planned data analysis. 
Empirical Measures 
Empirical measures for the variables in the model draw on the theoretical discussion 
and case evidence on the nature of the variables.  The measure for the dependent 
variable, degree of strategic control, is discussed first followed by the levels used to 
represent the independent variables, the four attributes of strategic control. 
Dependent Variable - Degree of Strategic control:  The dependent variable cannot be 
defined as the actual strategic control decisions of companies as in practice this 
measure is confounded by the objectives of management.  To overcome this problem 
the subjective evaluations of subjects are captured in the context of an experiment 
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where other motivating factors can be held constant.  The conjoint experiment 
achieves this objective by presenting different combinations of the strategic control 
variables with all other extraneous variables held constant.  A mixture of measures, 
similar to Rosenberg's (1956) category assignment and rating task, is used to capture 
the decisions of the subjects.  First, the practitioner’s subjects make a dichotomous 
strategic controlled-not strategic controlled decision.  High task familiarity, associated 
with the correspondence between the experimental task and the parameters for the 
subject's real word decisions, is likely to result in more reliable strategic control 
decisions.  
A second measure of the dependent variable requires the subjects to rate the 
degree of confidence they have in their decisions.  Decision confidence is measured 
on a 5-point Likert-type scale with anchor points at "Not Too Confident" and 
"Extremely Confident".  This measure allows subjects to indicate the strategic control 
decisions that they feel represent 'grey' or uncertain cases.  An 'index' of possible 
states of dominant strategic control is then formulated by taking the product of the 
strategic control evaluations (i.e. strategic controlled-not strategic controlled) and the 
confidence rating on a 5-point scale.  This multinomial strategic control 'index' 
simultaneously reflects the practitioner's dichotomous operationalization of the 
concept, and approximates the continuous strategic control concept depicted in Figure 
0.1. 
Independent Variables - Levels of Strategic control Attributes:  The independent 
variables were manipulated through a series of cases.  Each case contained varying 
levels of the independent variables.  Table 2 below summarizes the levels for each of 
the attributes.  
 
Table 2: Independent Variables - Levels for Strategic control Attributes 
Independent Variable Levels for Strategic control Attribute 
Total Percentage Ownership (Xi1) 15%, 30%, 45%, 49%, 51%, and 65% 
Fraction of Ownership Direct (Xi2) 0%, 40%, 60%, and 100% a 
Dispersion of Other Ownership (Xi3) "Widely Held", 10%, 20%, and 30% 
Level of Membership on 10 Member Board (Xi4) 2, 4, 6, and 8 members 
a
 The % Indirect = 100% − % Direct 
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The choice of levels for each attribute was influenced by: 
1. the legislation and standards regulating reporting practices; 
2. case evidence of the attributes influencing strategic control;  
3. research evidence on the number and spacing of attribute levels; and 
4. practical issues of subject fatigue and interest in the case. 
The levels for the percentage ownership attribute are 15, 30, 45, 49, 51 and 65 
per cent of the shares.  The six levels represent points surrounding the conventional 
equity accounting and consolidation cut-offs (i.e. 20 and 50 per cent) and therefore 
capture perceptions at the margins of these traditional measures.  Four of the levels 
are concentrated in the 30-51 per cent band, as the focus of the study is the cut-off for 
dominant strategic control and therefore consolidation (not the lower bound for equity 
accounting).  The 15 per cent level represents an arbitrary lower end ownership level 
at which strategic control might be possible, and 65 per cent represents an arbitrary 
maximum ownership level associated with no strategic control.  This gives a total of 
six levels for the instrument.  Prior research suggests that additional levels increase 
subject's evaluation load, with limited or no gain for the results.   
The total ownership attribute is presented in four combinations of direct and 
indirect ownership.  Direct ownership is set to be either zero, 40, 60, or 100 per cent 
of the total ownership (which respectively corresponds with 100, 60, 40 and zero per 
cent indirect ownership).  The 100 per cent direct ownership level reflects cases where 
the dominant entity holds only a simple direct holding in another firm.  Conversely 
the holding by the dominant entity may be 100 per cent indirect.  The two 
intermediate combinations reflect holdings which are either majority direct (i.e. 60/40 
per cent direct/indirect) or majority indirect (i.e. 60/40 per cent indirect/direct).  Again 
additional intermediate attribute levels would significantly increase the evaluation 
task for subjects. 
Dispersion of ownership is represented by four levels.  At one extreme all 
shares not owned by the dominant entity are said to be "widely held".  This represents 
situations where less than 10 percent of the remaining equity in the investee is held by 
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a single entity.  The other three levels of dispersion, 10, 20 and 30 per cent, represent 
the percentage of other shares closely held in a cohesive block.  These levels 
recognize that the probability of action by block holders increases as the size of the 
block increases.  A 10 per cent block is the minimum sized block that prima facie 
indicates a closely held firm (see Chapter 2).  The total ownership level of 65 per cent 
places an upper bound on the percentage that can logically be closely held.  The 
maximum percentage representing closely held was therefore set marginally below 
this upper bound at 30 per cent.  The final level, 20 per cent, is the mid point between 
the 10 and 30 per cent levels. 
The four levels of non-independent board membership are 2, 4, 6, and 8 
directors on an average sized ten-member Board of Directors.  The two points either 
side of the 'majority' cut-off, 4 and 6 directors out of ten, respectively reflect 
situations where the dominant entity either has significant influence or strategic 
control of the board's decisions.  An absolute dominant position of 8 members on the 
board was also set.  The two majority positions of 6 and 8 common board members 
are drawn directly from the Adsteam case.  Finally a minority position of 2 non-
independent board members was selected to complete the range for the board 
membership levels.   
Data Collection Procedures 
The test instrument defined each of the attributes in turn.  It also included 
instructions for the subjects on how to evaluate the case cards and self score their 
responses.  These instructions are reproduced below. 
 
1. Detach along the perforations each of the 38 cases to form a series of "cards". 
 
2. Sort all 38 "cards" into two piles -- one pile for those cases you consider company X 
strategic controls company Z and one pile for those where company X does not strategic 
control company Z.  Some respondents may wish to use a third 'doubtful' pile, which is 
then re-evaluated and split as appropriate between the strategic control and not strategic 
control piles. 
 
3. Examine the contents of your final two piles, making sure that you agree with your 
evaluation, swapping some "cards" over to the other pile if you like. 
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4. Taking each pile in turn, record your responses on the response form over the page.  
Make sure that you circle YES if you consider company X does strategic control 
company Z and NO for each case you consider company X does not strategic control 
company Z.  Also indicate how confident you are about your evaluation on the 5-point 
scale. (See example below) 
 
5. Complete the additional questions concerning your evaluations and background.  Seal the 
response booklet in the reply-paid envelope and place in the post. 
 
The card sort approach was chosen for three reasons.  First, card sorting (also 
referred to as Q sorts) is a proven research method for capturing individual opinions, 
preferences and decisions (Stephenson, 1953; Rosenberg, 1956; Kerlinger, 1986) and 
is often used in marketing conjoint studies (Green and Srinivasan, 1978; Wittink and 
Cattin, 1989).  Second, the method allows subjects to freely compare and sort the case 
cards, a freedom that conventional 'rate-the-list' formats do not afford.  This means 
subjects can separate straight forward cases from a 'doubtful' pile that can be returned 
to for more careful consideration.  If the card format makes it easier for the subjects to 
assess the cases then judgment quality is likely to be higher.  Third, the 'game-like' 
quality of the task generates subject interest.  Such a positive disposition on the part of 
subjects may improve the probability of obtaining quality responses.  Subjects were 
also required to provide self-explicated ratings of the importance of each strategic 
control attribute.   
The following example case and response form provided a guide for the 
subjects: 
 
EXAMPLE CASE PRESENTATION: 
 
X's Total Level of Ownership of Z's Stock 65% 
X's Level of Direct Versus Indirect Ownership in Z All direct 
Dispersion of Ownership of Other Stock in Z Widely Held 
Company X's Representation on Z's Board of Directors 8 of 10 
 
 
If you judge that company X does strategic control company Z then place this case in the 
strategic control pile and record your evaluation by circling YES on the response form.  If you feel 
EXTREMELY CONFIDENT about your classification then circle a number close to 5, as below.  
 
 
Case     Does Co. X  Not too       Extremely 
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No.  Strategic control Co. Z? Confident 1  2  3  4  5
 Confident 
E.g. YES  NO  1 2 3 4 5O 
 
 
If, however, you are NOT TOO CONFIDENT about your classification of the case then circle a 
number closer to 1, as appropriate. Be sure to use the full range of the scale to indicate the degree 
of confidence you have in your evaluations and remember there are no right answers to this task.  
We are interested in YOUR PERCEPTIONS of the strategic control relationship. 
Conjoint Analysis: 
Conjoint analysis is a method for estimating the joint effect of two or more 
independent variables on the ranking, preference for, or ordering, of a dependent 
variable.  Conjoint methods developed in mathematical psychology as a way of 
decomposing judgments of multi-attribute alternatives to reveal the implicit 
(unmeasurable) importance attached to the underlying dimensions (Debreu, 1960; 
Luce and Tukey, 1964; Krantz, 1964; Krantz and Tversky, 1971; Srinivasan and 
Shocker, 1973; Green and Rao, 1971; Green, 1974).  The emergence of conjoint 
analysis paralleled the development of multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) techniques 
(e.g. Coombs, 1964).  Both  are designed to analyze ordered judgments.   
Conjoint methods are more powerful techniques than MDS for analyzing 
judgments of multi-attribute alternatives as they allow the researcher to decompose 
total-object evaluations to reveal the decision importance of the underlying attributes.  
The philosophy implicit in conjoint's decomposition approach is that humans form 
judgments in a holistic fashion.  Decision makers do not necessarily assign explicit 
weights to every, or even any, of the underlying attributes (Shepard, 1964).  More 
importantly, there is no adequate independent measure for the weights decision 
makers assign to the underlying dimensions (Luce and Tukey, 1964; Krantz and 
Tversky, 1971).  The research on subjective measures in psychology even suggests 
subjects are inaccurate in the explicit importance ratings they attach to the 
components of their own decisions.   
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There have been few applications of conjoint analysis in the accounting and 
auditing research (see Krogstad, Ettenson and Shanteau, 1984), or the research in 
strategic management, economics and finance (e.g. Slovic, Fleissner, and Bauman, 
1972; Teas and Dellva, 1985; Zinkhan, 1990).  Conjoint analysis, however, features 
widely in the marketing literature, which has refined the conjoint methods as a 
research tool.  Marketing researchers use it to measure consumer preferences for the 
attributes of products (Green and Wind, 1973, Cattin and Wittink, 1982, 1989; Hair et 
al, 1987).  The focus is on how the product attributes, such as the desirability of red 
versus green sports cars, are valued by potential customers.  Similarly this study's 
concern is with the relative importance (i.e. decision impact) of different attributes of 
the strategic control multi-attribute information sets.  Conjoint analysis is the 
appropriate method for addressing the issues of this study.  It also represents a 
potentially valuable research tool to strategic management researchers.   
Methods other: 
During the instrument development: (1) an orthogonal array as the factorial 
design for the study was identified; (2) the initial set of stimuli case cards were 
developed; (3) the initial cases were evaluated and adapted; and (4) the stimuli and 
instructions were pretested.  The test instrument and instructions were circulated 
amongst the accounting faculty at the University of Southern California, Los Angeles, 
and Bond University, Gold Coast, Australia, and the marketing faculty at Murdoch 
University, Perth, Australia.  The revised version of the instrument was then pre-
tested on seven subjects whose occupational credentials included experience as 
directors, financial executives, security analysts and accountants.  The results for the 
pre-test, and the suggestions received from the subjects, resulted in only minor 
modifications to the test instrument.   
Two further pre-tests were conducted using forty-three students majoring in 
accounting.  The purpose of the first test with the students was to check for any 
remaining ambiguities in wording and instructions.  It also provided an estimate of the 
total time burden and clerical effort required by the response format. The objective of 
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the second pre-test was to establish the stability of the responses to the test 
instrument.  The second pre-test, using the same students, was conducted ten weeks 
after the first.  The estimated models for the two pre-tests were not significantly 
different at either the individual or group levels and no adjustments were deemed 
necessary.   
The predictive ability of the M individual models and the aggregate model were 
assessed.  Any identified 'poor performers' - subjects exhibiting low levels of structure 
and hence low predictive ability - were excluded from further analysis at this stage 
(Hair et al, 1987).  The estimated regression model for each individual and the 
aggregate model are used to 'predict' each subject's decision for the 32 estimation 
cases and for the 6 holdout cases.  Pearson correlations indicate the degree that the 
predicted and actual decisions agree for both the estimation and holdout sets of cases 
The model was estimated separately for each respondent using the Conjoint Module 
in SPSS-PC (SPSS, 1990).  This module produces OLS parameter estimates and 
predictive analysis for each of the M = 246 individual respondents.  An aggregate (i.e. 
average) model is calculated from the mean estimated attribute coefficients for the M 
individual models.  Henceforth the average model is referred to as the aggregate 
model. 
Prior to estimating the individual and aggregate models, the strategic control 
judgments were re-scaled to enhance the validity of the parametric analysis.  Interval 
scale data is insensitive to linear transformations (Torgerson, 1967, p. 19), so the 
judgment data were re-scaled to lie on the equidistant ten point scale -4.5 to +4.5 
(initially the responses were represented by the ten integer values -5 to +5 excluding 
zero).  The input data were also standardized so that the parameter estimates for the 
individual models could legitimately be compared across respondents and to enhance 
Page 25 of 33 
the interpretation of the aggregate model coefficients.  Table 3 presents a summary of 
the parameter estimates for the M individual models and the aggregate model. 
 
Table 3: Parameter Estimates for the M Individual Models  
and the Aggregate Model 
 Panel A: M Individual Models Panel B: Aggregate Model 
Independent 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile % β^j,m β^j,m−  a,b 
1-Tail 
Variable    Sig. at 0.10 (t-Value)c p-Value 
Constant ( β^0) 
-2.671 -2.402 -2.023 100% -2.329 < 0.001 
 
    (-80.92)  
Own  (β^1) 
3.039 3.850 4.577 99.2% 3.666 < 0.001 
 
    (50.04)  
Dir/Ind ( β^2) 
-0.071 0.099 0.375 29.3% 0.191 < 0.001 
 
    (7.76)  
Disp  ( β^3) 
-1.815 -0.622 0.191 43.5% -0.806 < 0.001 
 
    (-8.84)  
Board  (β^4) 
1.174 1.906 2.678 89.4% 1.959 < 0.001 
     (29.13)  
a
 Mean β^j for the M = 246 individual models is signified by the 'm−' subscript. 
b
 Aggregate model R2 = 0.5832, and Adjusted R2 = 0.5830. 
c
 t-test for H0: βj,m− = 0, df = 32-5=27. 
 
The F-statistics for each of the M individual models were significant (p < 0.01) 
suggesting each model has significant in-sample explanatory power.  The pooled 
residuals can also be used to test the combined explanatory power of the individual 
models, irrespective of whether there is contemporaneous correlation between the 
residuals for the individual models.  An additional F-statistic is constructed from the 
pooled OLS residuals for the M individual equations as this is equivalent to a test of 
the seemingly unrelated regression estimation of the entire set of equations (Zellner, 
1962; Dwivedi and Srivastava, 1978; Hirschey, 1981; Judge et al, 1985, 1988; 
Dielman, 1989).  The F-Value for the pooled residuals is 17.39 (df = 984, 6642, p < 
0.001).  This confirms the M individual F-tests and implies that the M individual 
models as a group have significant explanatory power.  Finally, an Omnibus F-test, 
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constructed to test the aggregate model, is significant (F = 9.39; df = 989, 6637; p < 
0.001) suggesting that the aggregate model has significant explanatory power too.   
There was no evidence of non-response bias.  The responses were also found to 
be consistent and in that sense the measures provided reliable data for the model 
estimation.  Table 3 summarizes the generic hypotheses and the results for the 
hypothesis testing reported in the chapter.   
 
Table 4: Summary of Hypotheses and Major Results 
Hypotheses Results 
Hypothesis One: Ownership is positively 
related to degree of strategic control 
 
H0: β1 = 0  
H1: β1 > 0 
H0: Rejected 
H1: Accepted 
Hypothesis Two: Directness of ownership is 
positively related to degree of strategic 
control 
 
H0: β2 = 0  
H2: β2 > 0 
H0: Rejected 
H2: Accepted 
Hypothesis Three: Dispersion is negatively 
related to degree of strategic control 
 
H0: β3 = 0  
H3: β3 < 0 
H0: Rejected 
H3: Accepted 
Hypothesis Four: Board membership is 
positively related to degree of strategic 
control 
 
H0: β4 = 0  
H4: β4 > 0 
H0: Rejected 
H4: Accepted 
 
The estimated aggregate model supported hypotheses one to four that all the 
attributes have a significant direct effect on degree of strategic control. The individual 
level analysis was less conclusive and suggested that the directness of ownership and 
dispersion attributes are significant for strategic control assessments for only some 
subjects.  All four attribute coefficients were, however, found to be different to each 
other at both the individual and aggregate levels.   
The estimated parameters for the model indicated that ownership and board 
membership are perceived to be the most important attributes in dominant strategic 
control relations.  However, the implicit weights for indirect ownership links, and low 
levels of dispersion of non-owned equity, suggests these attributes are perceived to 
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mitigate the level of dominant strategic control achieved through ownership and board 
membership.   
Conclusions/Discussion: 
The results for the model estimation allowed the acceptance of hypotheses one 
to four that each of the four attributes has a significant impact on the degree of 
strategic control.  Our further empirical evaluations suggest that the parameters are 
also unequal.  The parameters for ownership, ownership complexity, dispersion, and 
board membership were all found to be significantly different for at least some of the 
individual models. 
The structure of the estimated strategic control model (see Table 3) implies that 
strategic control can be established through 100 per cent ownership but not by 100 per 
cent board membership.  Ownership is therefore sufficient for strategic control.  
Where there is less than 60-64 per cent ownership (i.e. the ratio of the coefficients for 
the constant and the ownership variable) then other strategic control attributes are 
necessary to achieve strategic control.  For instance, an inter-entity relation consisting 
of 40 per cent ownership, all of which is direct, with all other stock widely held, also 
requires at least 34 per cent of the board membership to attain the threshold level of 
strategic control of a zero score for the model.  Board membership by itself is not 
sufficient to achieve strategic control.  Some level of the other three strategic control 
attributes (i.e. ownership, direct holding or low dispersion) are required to outweigh 
the negative constant in the model and establish a threshold level of strategic control. 
Although ownership and board membership have the largest contribution in 
the strategic control model, the results indicate that the level of direct versus indirect 
ownership and dispersion of ownership also contribute to the strategic control index.  
Lower levels of ownership or board membership are required if the shareholding is 
direct.  It is easier to exert the power associated with board positions and/or 
ownership if a greater percentage of the holding is direct.  If there is a high probability 
that others can challenge the dominant position (i.e. remaining shares are dispersely 
held), then the absolute level of ownership and/or the level of board membership has 
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to be higher to establish and maintain dominant strategic control.  Conversely, total 
board dominance with a small equity interest is unlikely to be left in place by other 
block shareholders.   
Our research suggest that only focusing on ownership links can lead to 
misrepresenting who actually controls the strategic actions of the firm.  Strategic 
control exists where one entity has the capacity to control the operating and financial 
management policies of another entity, irrespective of whether there is a majority 
ownership interest.  In contrast, de jure strategic control is the right of one entity to 
participate in asset distributions of another through ownership, which may or may not 
confer decision making control. 
Our research suggests that combinations of attributes gives one entity 
"strategic control" over the decision making of another entity.  The model which we 
empirically developed from an Agency Theory foundation will assist strategic 
management practitioners to assess the extent of strategic control in inter-entity 
relationships. Our predictive model provides compelling evidence to assist 
practitioners in determining how to achieve strategic control over another entity.  The 
attributes identified in the model could also form the basis on ways to achieve 
strategic control without the costs of majority equity investment. Attributes of 
strategic control, other than ownership, may produce much more cost effective 
devices for establishing and maintaining strategic control of another entity.  The 
model will help identify possible trade-offs in structuring inter-entity links.  
Conversely the model could be useful in identifying takeover defence strategies. 
Limitations of The Research 
The power of the estimation models and other statistical tests is dependent on 
both the sample size and significance levels employed.  There were 27 degrees of 
freedom (ie. T-K = 32-5) for the individual regression models which, while not large, 
is sufficient for valid inference.  Compensatory estimation errors are neutralized by 
forming an aggregate model and the pooling process which has at least M x (T-k) 
degrees of freedom (where M = 246).  Given the sample size, the probability of type II 
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error is low.  Further, the low significance levels for most of the analysis means that 
the probability of type I error is also low.  
The reliability of the measures employed impacts directly the level of noise in 
the data.  No direct testing of reliability of the measures was possible for the test 
subjects.  Nevertheless co nsistency analysis suggests that the respondents were far 
from random in their responses.  It is therefore unlikely that the measures introduced 
significant levels of noise into the data.  Other sources of error stem from the quasi-
experiment design.  The mail questionnaire does not allow complete control of the 
treatment implementation or the impact of extraneous sources of variation unique to 
each data collection site.  The only control possible in the design was a standard set of 
instructions to respondents on the procedures to follow.  The exact error from this 
source can only be estimated from further true experiment applications of the 
instrument. 
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Figure 1: Categories on the Strategic control Continuum 
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